4102212 Motion for Interlocutory Default Judgment - MOTION - DEFAULT JUDGMENT October 15, 2019 (2024)

Case

Richard Dunsmore vs. Linda Joann Dunsmore

Case

LAQUITA HOWARD vs. LATONDRIA RENEICE

Jul 31, 2024 |MOYE', ERIC |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11391

Case

Valerie Conway vs. Joseline Barkat

Jul 26, 2024 |WYSOCKI, ASHLEY |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11189

Case

Maria Montes Martinez, et al vs. Francisco Javier Martinez, et al

Jul 29, 2024 |SLAUGHTER, GENA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11209

Case

Elizabeth Acurero vs. Robert Nastase

Jul 26, 2024 |TILLERY, DALE |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11144

Case

TRINITY GENERAL AGENCY, LLC A/S/O ROGER DALE BURKS vs. DESTINY B DIXON

Jul 31, 2024 |SLAUGHTER, GENA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11465

Case

GWENDOLYN WEST vs. CONTESSA WEST

Jul 29, 2024 |PARKER, TONYA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11332

Case

SHANE ALEXANDER GOSNELL vs. RAYMOND BEAMON

Case

RONNIE CRAIG vs. ZACHARY EMERY, et al

Jul 29, 2024 |HOFFMAN, MARTIN |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11220

Ruling

HOWELL vs SUNLINE TRANSIT AGENCY

Jul 31, 2024 |CVPS2401522

HOWELL vs SUNLINE TRANSIT Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First AmendedCVPS2401522AGENCY ComplaintTentative Ruling: The hearing will be continued to September 11, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in this departmentso that the parties can meet and confer as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41.Section 430.41 (a) states in relevant part: “Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, thedemurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleadingthat is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached thatwould resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” Here the parties’ neglected their duty to meetand confer as required by statute. It may well be that a meet and confer will not resolve this demurrer.The likelihood of a resolution is, however, irrelevant. The California Legislature determined that themeet and confer process was sufficiently important that it be codified into law. Even the items to bediscussed as part of the meet and confer process are set out in detail in Section 430.41 subdivision (a),subsections (1) and (2). The Court does not intend to allow parties to determine when, and under whatcirc*mstances, they will comply with the law. Counsel are officers of the court and members of the bar.Separate and apart from any legal obligation to comply with the subject statute, counsel have an ethicalobligation to do so.This Court has ordered in other cases, and will continue to order, that demurrer hearings be continuedto allow parties who have failed to meet and confer to do so.After meeting and conferring, moving party shall, at least 10 days before the continued hearing date setabove, do one of the following:(1) Vacate the hearing on the motion/demurrer; or(2) File with the Court a joint declaration of all counsel stating the means by which the parties metand conferred and identifying the specific outstanding disputes that the parties have not resolved. Thedeclaration should include a brief description of (i) each issue or issues to be resolved and (ii) theparties’ respective positions regarding each issue. Each issue should be described in a singleparagraph, and each party’s position should be described in no more than two paragraphs per issue.The court will not accept further briefing.The parties’ failure to engage in a good faith meet and confer process or failure to file a joint declarationas ordered will result in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5. An Order to ShowCause re sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure Section 177.5 for failure to comply with this ordershall be set on September 11, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.

Ruling

HUMANMADE, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION VS. 150 HOOPER, INC., ET AL

Jul 31, 2024 |CGC23605908

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Wednesday, July 31, 2024, Line 5, DEFENDANT 150 HOOPER, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION'S DEMURRER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT. Transferred to be heard in department 501 on August 14, 2024. That department handles all lease cases per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/RBU)

Ruling

GUSTAVO EDUARDO TAMAYO BASKIN, ET AL. VS SPECIALTY SURGICAL CENTER, ET AL.

Jul 31, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV02729

Case Number: 23SMCV02729 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: I This is a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff states that it will not oppose the motion if defendant waives costs. That is not technically properthere is no conditional non-opposition where the condition is a settlement. However, the court will inquire whether defendant agrees to waive costs. If so, the motion will be GRANTED and defendant can prepare a judgment. The court notes that this is a merits motion, so the judgment will also be on the merits.

Ruling

JACQUELINE BENJAMIN, ET AL. VS SHAOBO MA, ET AL.

Jul 30, 2024 |21STCV12123

Case Number: 21STCV12123 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 30, 2024 CASE NUMBER 21STCV12123 MOTION Continue Trial MOVING PARTIES Defendants Mark Lolo and Yulia Lolo OPPOSING PARTY none MOTION Defendants/Cross-Defendants/Cross-Complainants Mark Lolo and Yulia Lolo (Defendants) move for an order to continue the trial in this matter from August 12, 2024 to January 20, 2025, and the Final Status Conference from August 2, 2024 to January 10, 2025, and to reopen discovery with cut-off dates commensurate with the new trial date. Defendants motion is unopposed. ANALYSIS Continuances are granted only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring a continuance. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) A trial court has broad discretion in considering a request for a trial continuance. (Pham v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 11, 13-18.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 sets forth factors for the Court to consider in ruling on a motion to continue trial. Whether the parties have stipulated to the postponement is a relevant factor for consideration. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 595.2, but see Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal. 753, 756-757 [finding a stipulation to be merely directory].) Further, a continuance or postponement of the trial does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (b); see also Pelton-Shepherd Indus., Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575, fn. 10 [on motion of any party, the court may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set].) Rule 3.1332(c), provides: Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. Circ*mstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. Factors the Court considers in ruling on a motion for continuance include: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circ*mstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) Defendants request a trial continuance on the grounds that their trial counsel is unavailable on the currently-scheduled trial date of August 12 because she will be out of the country on a pre-paid family trip that was set prior to the Court unilaterally setting the current trial date on June 25, 2024. (Mader Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendants themselves are also unavailable on the currently-scheduled trial date due, as they must suddenly be out of the country to care for a disabled parent. (Mader Decl. ¶ 4.) The Court finds that Defendants sudden unavailability on the trial date due to the need to care for a disabled parent out of the country constitutes good cause to continue the imminent trial date, notwithstanding that there have been several prior continuances. This case is approximately three and a half years old, so the requested continuance will not run up against the five-year deadline. However, the Court does not find that Defendants have shown good cause to reopen discovery, including to take the depositions of Defendants Shaobo Ma and Tevin Tasher. Defendants contend that the depositions of Ma and Tasher have been unable to proceed despite diligent efforts, but Defendants describe attempts by other parties namely, Plaintiffs and the Nonos defendant to schedule and take the depositions of Ma and Tasher. Defendants do not demonstrate that they were diligent in timely noticing the depositions of Ma or Tasher, or establish their efforts to enforce their right to complete non-expert discovery, e.g., filing and scheduling motions to compel discovery. In fact, the Court finds that Mader declaration illustrates how the parties, including Defendants, have been dilatory in ensuring that discovery, whether non-expert or expert, is completed per the Discovery Act, especially when the action was initiated over 3 years ago. As such, the Court does not find good cause to reopen discovery or otherwise re-set the discovery deadlines. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants in part Defendants motion to continue the trial. But instead of rescheduling the trial and final status conference, the Court, on its own motion, will vacate the current trial and final status conference, and schedule a Trial Readiness Conference on August 28, 2024 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207. The parties shall file a Joint Trial Readiness Report no later than August 21, 2024, which shall provide an agreed date, or time period, when all parties will be available for trial, which shall not be beyond March 28, 2025. Moreover, the Court denies in part Defendants motion to reopen discovery for the reasons stated above without prejudice. Until further order of the Court, all discovery remains closed. Defendants shall provide notice of the Courts orders, and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 30, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

JANICE M. COOK ET AL VS. ANNING-JOHNSON COMPANY

Jul 30, 2024 |CGC24277216

On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 30, 2024 in Department 301, Line 3. Defendant Novartis Corporation's filed a Motion to Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Opposition filed by Plaintiff. Reply filed by Defendant. The Court is inclined to grant Plaintiffs' request to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. Hearing required and counsel are ordered present. The moving party shall lodge with the clerk in Department 301 by the time set for this hearing a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling. Any party wishing to contest the tentative ruling must email contestasbestostr@sftc.org by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing and state their intention to contest. If a hearing is requested, it will be on July 30, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. Attorneys may appear in person or remotely via zoom: Meeting ID 160 757 8308; Passcode: 485029. Face coverings are optional. The Court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law and Motion department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: Their name, CSR and telephone number, and their individual work email address. There will be only one official record. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will designate a qualified court reporter to provide the official transcript for the matter, and the party or parties will bear the cost. = (301/RCE)

Ruling

ROSEVIANNEY C OGUMSI VS RICHARD DALE GENTILE, D.D.S., ET AL.

Jul 31, 2024 |22STCV13792

Case Number: 22STCV13792 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT ROSEVIANNEY C. OGUMSI Plaintiff(s), vs. RICHARD DALE GENTILE, D.D.S., et al., Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22STCV3792 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO TAX COSTS Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 31, 2024 ) I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Rosevianney C. Ogumsi filed this action against defendants Heydar Shahrokh, D.D.S. and Heydar Shahrokh, D.D.S., Inc., dba Comfort Dental Center (collectively, Defendants) on April 26, 2022. On May 6, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants following their motion for summary judgment. On May 21, 2024, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs and served it on Plaintiff via mail. On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion to strike or tax costs. Plaintiff moves to strike: (a) $2,760 in filing and motion fees, (b) $8,322.16 for deposition costs, (c) $89 for service of process, (d) $1,200 in witness fees, (e) $270.60 for transcripts, and (f) $9,325 for court reporter fees. Defendants filed an opposition brief on July 24, 2024. Plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 29, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 (all statutory references to follow are to the Code of Civil Procedure except when otherwise indicated) provides for recovery of costs by a prevailing party. Allowable costs under Section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.¿An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount).¿If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.¿(Ibid.) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.¿(Ibid.)¿However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute, a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.¿(Id.)¿Discretion is abused only when, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circ*mstances being considered.¿(Ibid.) In ruling upon a motion to tax costs, the trial courts first determination is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face, if so, the burden is on the objecting party to show the costs to be unnecessary and unreasonable. Where costs are not expressly allowed by statute, the burden is on the party claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and necessary. III. DISCUSSION Filing and Motion Fees Plaintiff complains that Defendants line item entries for filing and motion fees are insufficient to establish that they were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and/or reasonable in amount. Section 1033.5 specifically authorizes the recovery of filing and motion fees and a review of the filings for which Defendants seek to recover their filings shows that they were reasonable. These filings include numerous pleadings such as answers, demurrers and special motions to strike in response to Plaintiffs initial and amended complaints, as well as two typical discovery motions, an ex parte application, and a summary judgment motion, which eventually disposed of this case. Plaintiff does not challenge any particular filing as unnecessary or unreasonable. Therefore, the motion to tax filing fees is DENIED. Deposition Costs Plaintiff moves to tax $8,322.16 for deposition costs. The memorandum of costs only lists $2,291.85 in connection with Plaintiffs deposition, taken on August 19, 2022, and 18 subpoenas duces tecum in a single block-billed entry of $6,030.31. Taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions are allowable costs pursuant to section 1033.5(a)(3). Therefore, the costs for deposing Plaintiff are, on its face, proper. However, there is no list of the specific deponents for whom the additional costs were incurred and Defendants opposition merely lists 27 pages of receipts for issuing those subpoenas, without demonstrating how these costs for 18 subpoenas were necessarily incurred. Therefore, the motion to tax deposition costs is GRANTED in part in the amount of $6,030.31. Service of Process Costs Plaintiff moves to strike $89 incurred for service on Soheil Yashari, D.D.S. (Dr. Yashari). Service of process fees are explicitly authorized by section 1033.5(a)(4) and Plaintiff offers no argument as to why this cost is unreasonable or not necessary to the litigation. The motion to tax this cost is DENIED. Expert Witness Fees Plaintiff objects to Defendants claimed cost of $1,200 for the expert, John Buoncristiani, D.D.S. Expert witness fees are allowed as costs if they are ordered by the Court or authorized by some other statute, such as Code of Civil Procedure section 998. There is no indication from the record that Dr. Buoncristiani was an expert ordered by the Court or that an offer to compromise pursuant to section 998 was made. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to strike the expense of $1,200 for expert witness fees. Court Reporter Fees Plaintiff moves to strike $9,325 for court reporter fees because they were not ordered by the Court. There is no statutory requirement that court reporters must be ordered by the Court in order for their fees to be recoverable. Nevertheless, Defendants memorandum of costs does not include any description identifying which hearings these court reporters were hired for and Defendants make no effort to identify them in their opposition brief, other than to attach copious pages of receipts. Therefore, although court reporter fees are allowable by statute, Defendants do not show how the entire amount was reasonable and necessary to the conduct of the litigation. The amount of $9,325 is taxed from Defendants cost memo. Transcript Fees Defendants claim $270.60 to for transcript fees. Transcript fees not ordered by the Court are expressly disallowed. (C.C.P., § 1033.5(b)(5).) Defendants only argue that the transcript ordered was later used to support their summary judgment motion, which is an insufficient basis for showing that it was ordered by the Court. The motion to tax the transcript fees is GRANTED. Models, Enlargements, and Photocopies of Exhibits Plaintiff moves to strike $214.06 claimed for models, enlargments, and photocopies of exhibits. The memorandum of costs specifies that $214.06 was incurred for photocopying, even though postage, telephone, and photocopying charges are not allowable as costs, except for exhibits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(b)(3).) Even if the photocopying charges were for exhibits, the cost to obtain models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits would be allowable under section 1033.5(a)(13) if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. Because Defendants prevailed at summary judgment, before any exhibits were presented to the trier of fact, these costs are not recoverable under section 1033.5(a)(13). Defendants also provide no explanation for why these costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation or reasonable. The Court, therefore, declines to exercise its discretion to allow their recover. The motion to tax $214.06 for photocopying costs is GRANTED. Fees for Electronic Filing or Service Plaintiff argues that the $783.70 in electronic filing/service fees claimed as costs by Defendants are not allowed by statute. However, Los Angeles County Superior Court requires electronic filing. Therefore, the fees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider are allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(14).) Nevertheless, Defendants do not specify how much each document cost to file or serve in an attachment and there is no evidence of these charges attached to their opposition brief. Accordingly, the motion to tax these costs is GRANTED. Court Imaging Costs Defendants attach receipts showing that they were charged to download various court documents. The costs incurred to download court documents are not expressly authorized by statute and Defendants do not explain why the downloaded documents were necessary to the conduct of the litigation. The motion to tax $110.40 for court document images is GRANTED. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is GRANTED in part. The amount taxed from Defendants memorandum of costs is $17,938.07, for a total amount remaining of $5,136.85 in recoverable costs. Dated this 31st day of July, 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Ruling

EUGENE CATANIA ET AL VS. MAURIZIO IANTORNO ET AL

Jul 29, 2024 |CGC24611660

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 29, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT MAURIZIO IANTORNO , AN INDIVIDUAL, 261 SILVER, LLC, A PURPORTED CALIFORNIA LIMITED's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT PER CCP SECTION 473 AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS. OFF CALENDAR per the request of moving party. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

RAPHAEL PARIENTE ZAPOTITLA VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Jul 31, 2024 |22STCV07401

Case Number: 22STCV07401 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: July 31, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV07401 MOTIONS: Motion for Protective Order or Strike Expert Designation MOVING PARTY: Raphael Pariente Zapotitla OPPOSING PARTY: BACKGROUND Plaintiff seeks a protective order compelling Defendant to choose between a neurosurgeon and orthopedist, or, in the alternative, for an order striking the expert designation of both. Defendant opposes and Plaintiff replies. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that Defendants neurosurgeon and orthopedic spine surgeon are designated for the same purpose and will provide testimony on the same topics, and are therefore cumulative, resulting in unnecessary deposition costs and the possibility that Plaintiff will need to retain another expert in rebuttal. Plaintiff further argues there is no prejudice to Defendant, particularly as neither has conducted an IME of Plaintiff. Defendant argues that the two experts practice in different areas of medicine and the designations demonstrate that the anticipated testimony will be different, in particular noting that neurosurgery and orthopedics are different fields of medicine. In light of Defendants representation that the two experts are anticipated to opine as to different areas, the Court cannot conclude that the testimony will be cumulative, particularly without deposition transcripts. Plaintiffs argument is based solely on the argument that one expert could testify about both topics.[1] Accordingly, the motion for protective order is denied. To the extent that the testimony is cumulative, Plaintiff can seek an order from the trial court limiting the testimony. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for protective order is DENIED. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such. [1] The authorities cited by Plaintiff involve the trial courts authority to exclude cumulative witnesses at trial, rather than, as Plaintiff asserts, [t]he designation of cumulative experts violates established California law. (Motion at p. 6 [emphasis added].)

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RONNIE CRAIG vs. ZACHARY EMERY, et al

Jul 29, 2024 |HOFFMAN, MARTIN |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11220

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GEORGE ROMERO vs. AMR ZIDAN, MDet al

Nov 21, 2023 |SLAUGHTER, GENA |MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |DC-23-19672

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RAY POPE, et al vs. BILLINDA JO PINSON, et al

Sep 05, 2023 |FRAZIER, VERETTA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-23-14233

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KAREN L. LARA vs. JUAN GUILLERMO TRUJILLO, et al

Jul 30, 2024 |REDMOND, AIESHA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-11415

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SHIH CHOU vs. CHARLIZE SPAULDING, VANESSA ROSARIO

Aug 21, 2023 |TAYLOR, NICOLE |DAMAGES (COLLISION) |Cc-23-05366-e

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JUDY "JESSIE " ADAMSet al vs. FLOWER MOUND HOSPITAL PARTNERS, LLC,

Nov 23, 2020 |HOFFMAN, MARTIN |MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |DC-20-17490

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FRANCINE L. WASHINGTON vs. ZIPCAR, INC.

Jul 31, 2024 |REDMOND, AIESHA |OTHER PERSONAL INJURY |DC-24-11390

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JUDY "JESSIE " ADAMSet al vs. FLOWER MOUND HOSPITAL PARTNERS, LLC,

Nov 23, 2020 |HOFFMAN, MARTIN |MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |DC-20-17490